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The operation of future intelligent transportation systems(Its) and communications infrastructure (CI) will be highly interdependent [1]. Tomorrow’s ITS will encompass Au-autonomous connected vehicles (ACVs) which require signify-cant wireless data transmissions through a CI such as wireless cellular system. Thus, any failure in the CI will resulting a non-optimal ITS traffic flow leading to traffic jams and inefficient fuel consumption. Meanwhile, road traffic cones-sons in the ITS will, in turn, require additional resources(e.g., bandwidth, power) from the CI due to interference and increased wireless traffic load. Such inter dependencies render both ITS and CI vulnerable to traffic jam attacks on ITS. In such attacks, an adversary hijacks some of the ACVs and reduces their speed thus causing road traffic jams which intern will strain the capacity of the CI. Remarkably, despite significant prior works on ITS or CI security [2], to our best knowledge, no work has analyzed this security interdependent-deny among the two. The main contribution of this paper into propose a novel Colonel Blotto game (CBG) framework[3] to analyze attacks on interdependent ITS and CI system sand devise optimal countermeasures to minimize the non-optimal in both ITS and CI caused by the physical attack.Simulation results show that the proposed CBG increases the security level of the ITS and CI compared to scenarios in which the administrator of the ITS and CI do not apply the solutions of such game. |
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